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STUDENT NOTES
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST TRESPASSES WHERE TITLE IS IN DISPUTE.-
There are many cases involving the question of whether equity
has "jurisdiction" to enjoin a trespass when the title to the property
is in dispute. It seems that it is not really a question of power, but
rather a question of whether the court will choose to exercise its
power or leave the question of title to the law court. Yet, the West
Virginia court continues to speak of lack of jurisdiction, in the
sense of power, rather than refusal to exercise jurisdiction where
the title is in dispute.
There has been a recent tendency for the courts of equity to
be more lenient with regard to granting injunctions against tres-
passes. However, the old rule that equity will not settle a title
dispute still persists.
The early cases in this jurisdiction were very strict in
laying down the rule that the plaintiff's title had to be either free
from dispute or have been settled by an ejectment action to obtain
injunctions against trespasses.'
The next question that arose was whether the plaintiff could
get a temporary injunction to restrain the trespass if he had an
action pending at law, or was immediately going to bring such
action, to settle the title question. The early cases held that even
in such cases, in order to be granted the injunction, the plaintiff
had to show irreparable injury, or that the defendant was insolvent
so that the legal remedy would be worthless. It was held that the
1 McMillan v. Ferrell, 7 W. Va. 223 (1874).
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cutting and removal of timber was not an irreparable injury.2
Dicta in a later case indicated that the removal of iron or coal
might be considered an irreparable injury and that a temporary
injunction would be granted in such case pending settlement at
law of the title question. 3
These holdings were followed in a series of cases on this ques-
tion in the late part of the nineteenth century.4
With regard to restraining the defendant from the removal of
oil and gas, it was held in Bettman v. Harness5 that such was an
irreparable injury and that an injunction would lie in such case
even though the title was in dispute. However, this holding was
not in point with regard to the present question because the facts
did not really involve a title dispute. A had made a lease to P
who did not go into possession; A later made a lease to D of the
same premises. P sought to enjoin D from drilling for oil and gas.
One of the leading cases on the question under discussion was
Freer v. Davis., It involved an injunction against removal of oil
and gas where the title was in dispute. The court distinguished
this case from the Bettman case. There, the question as to the
validity of the two leases was merely a question of law while in this
case there was a boundary dispute which was a question of fact
for jury determination. The court then summarized the law in
West Virginia as to how far equity would go to enjoin a trespass
when the title was in dispute. The strictness of noninterference
in such cases had been relaxed only to the extent that equity would
grant an injunction pending settlement of the title question at law,
and even then, only if it were shown that there would be irreparable
injury in the absence of the injunction. Thus, the court set the
limit on the jurisdiction that equity would exercise in these cases.
The proposition that where equity has taken jursidiction for one
purpose, it will do complete justice between the parties, even to
the extent of determining legal rights, was held not to extend to
the question of title.
However, these injunctions pending settlement of the title
question at law were still denied when the plaintiff wanted to
2 CoX v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 175 (1882).
3 See Becker v. McGraw, 48 W. Va. 539, 541, 37 S.E. 532, 533 (1900).
4 Burns v. Mearns, 44 W. Va. 744, 80 S.E. 112 (1898); Lazzell v. Garlow,
44 W. Va. 466, 80 S.E. 171 (1898); Watson v. Ferrell, 34 W. Va. 406, 12 S.E. 724
(1890); Kemble v. Cresap, 26 W. Va. 603 (1885); Schoonover v. Bright, 24 W. Va.
698 (1884).
r42 IV. Va. 433, 26 S.E. 271 (1896).
0 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164 (1902).
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enjoin the cutting and removal of timber. Such was held not to
be an irreparable injury.7 Then in Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co.,'
another leading case, the court held that the cutting and removal
of timber is always an irreparable injury and expressly overruled
the earlier cases 6n that point."
The law seems to be well settled today in West Virginia that
if the title is in dispute, equity will not grant an injunction unless
there is an action pending or about to be brought at law. Equity
will not settle the title question if it is a question of fact for the
jury.10
If the title dispute involves only a question of law, there being
no issues of fact for the jury, equity will exercise its jurisdiction to
grant an injunction even though no action at law is pending to
determine the title question. 11 In this case equity will assume
jurisdiction to settle the title dispute and restrain the trespass in
the same suit. To defeat equity jurisdiction, the title dispute must
be of the type that makes intervention of a trial by jury necessary.
If the title question involves construction of a deed or title papers,
it is merely a question of law for the court. Thus, to this extent
equity will try title.
It is also well settled that the plaintiff need not show irrepar-
able injury to get an injunction against a continuing trespass where
the title is not in dispute. 12 Thus, it would seem that an injunction
7Curtin v. Stout, 57 W. Va. 271, 50 S.E. 810 (1905).
870 W. Va. 68, 73 S.E. 82 (1911); accord, Waldron v. Ritter, 70 W. Va. 470,
74 S.E. 687 (1912). Note that in these cases there was an action pending at law
to determine the title dispute.
9 Marcum v. Marcum, 57 W. Va. 285, 50 S.E. 246 (1905); Curtin v. Stout,
57 W. Va. 271, 50 S.E. 810 (1905); Stephenson & Coon v. Burdett, 56 W. Va.
109, 48 S.E. 846 (1904); Burns v. Mearns, 44 W. Va. 744, 30 S.E. 112 (1898);
Kemble v. Cresap, 26 W. Va. 603 (1885); Schoonover v. Bright, 24 W. Va. 698
(1884); Cox v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 175 (1882); Western M. & M. Co. v. Virginia
Cannel Coal Co., 10 W. Va. 250 (1877); McMillan v. Ferrell, 7 W. Va. 223 (1874).
10 Huffman v. Chedester, 126 W. Va. 73,27 S.E.2d 272 (1943); Stickler v. Bays.
116 W. Va. 463, 181 S.E. 717 (1935); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hays Oil & Gas
Co., 107 W. Va. 255, 148 S.E. 76 (1929); McDonald v. Boggs, 97 W. Va. 201, 124
S.E. 680 (1924); Galford v. Henry, 93 W. Va. 404, 116 S.E. 683 (1923); Carrie
v. Kennedy, 80 W. Va. 694, 93 S.E. 807 (1917); Barth v. Shepherd, 80 W. Va.
218, 92 S.E. 317 (1917); Beatty v. Edgell, 75 W. Va. 252, 83 S.E. 903 (1914);
Hudson v. Iguano Land & Mining Co., 71 W. Va. 402, 76 S.E. 797 (1912).
11 Columbia Gas & Electric Co. v. Moore, 81 W. Va. 164, 93 S.E. 1051 (1917);
Halstead v. Aliff, 78 W. Va. 480, 89 S.E. 721 (1916); Myers v. Bland, 77 W. Va.
546, 87 S.E. 868 (1916); Bradley v. Swope, 77 W. Va. 113, 87 S.E. 86 (1915); Ephriam
Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Bragg, 75 W. Va. 70, 83 S.E. 190 (1914); Electro Metal-
lurgical Co. v. Montgomery, 70 W. Va. 754, 74 S.E. 994 (1912); Suit v. Hoch-
stetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307 (1908).
12 Lilly v. Bowling, 120 W. Va. 169, 197 S.E. 299 (1938); Henline v. Miller,
117 W. Va. 439, 185 S.E. 852 (1936); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 109 W. Va. 111, 153 S.E.
146 (1930).
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against a continuing trespass could be obtained even though the
title is in dispute if there is an action of ejectment pending or about
to be brought at law.13 If the situation is such that the court
would grant an injunction if the title were not in dispute, it seems
that an injunction should be granted if an action of ejectment is
pending where the title is in dispute.14
From the foregoing discussion it is easy to see that although
equity will settle title where the dispute involves merely a question
of law, and will also grant an injunction to restrain trespasses when
an enjectment action is pending or immediately to be brought at
law, equity still refuses to exercise its jurisdiction to settle a title
dispute where issues of fact for the jury are involved.
R.A.K.
JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS IN WEST VIRGINIA.-The question of
the validity of joint and mutual wills was presented before the court
in the case of Underwood v. Myers., The court, deciding against the
defendant's contention that such wills are invalid, recognized the
following principle:
"When mutual and joint wills were first considered by the
English courts, they were disapproved and the earlier Ameri-
can decisions also pronounce against them; but the more
modern views of the courts of both countries sustain the
validity of such wills and declare they are not contrary to
public policy." 2
Therefore, it is seen that the West Virginia court clearly
recognizes the validity of joint and mutual wills. With this as a
starting point it will be the intended purpose to present the legal
effect of such wills as determined from an examination of the West
Virginia cases involving joint and mutual wills. It should be
noted that this discussion will not consider the effect of attempted
revocation prior to the death of either of the makers of the will.
In order to discuss intelligently joint and mutual wills, it is
necessary that the terms be dearly defined. In West Virginia a
joint will is a testamentary instrument with reciprocal provisions
executed pursuant to an agreement or compact jointly signed by
two or more persons. Perhaps, an extract from a West Virginia
case will best illustrate:
13 See Henline v. Miller, 117 W. Va. "439, 443, 185 S.E. 852, 853 (1936).
14 Cf. West Virginia Development Co. v. Preston County Development Co.,
76 W. Va. 492, 495, 85 S.E. 668, 669 (1915).
1 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929).
2 Id. at 59, 146 S.E. at 896.
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